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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
503, 94 AtI. 269; Crevelli v. Chicago 11. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1917) 98 Wash.
42, 166 Pac. 66. But the more modern view seems to be that the marriage
relation is insufficient for the imputation of liability except where the negli-
gent person acted as agent for the other. Phillips v. Denver City Tramway
Co. (1912) 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460; Love v. Detroit, J. & C. R. Co. (1912)
170 Mich. 1, 135 N. W. 963; Macdonald v. O'Reilly (1904) 45 Ore. 589, 78
Pac. 753. In the light of the dissolution of the common-law unity of hus-
band and wife, the latter view seems preferable, and the Missouri court in
the principal case decided to adopt it and overrule its previous view.
O'Flaherty v. Union Ry. Co., above.
The decision that there could be no apportionment of damages seems to
be based almost entirely upon the fact that the statutory sum is described
as a penalty. The full amount was awarded despite the many cases in
other jurisdictions which abate the award to the extent of the interest of
persons contributorily negligent. This view seems to be accepted in all
other states where contributory negligence is considered a defense to the
statutory action and where the negligence of one parent is not to be im-
puted to the other. Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., above; Wolf v.
Lake Erie & W. R. Co. (1896) 55 Ohio St. 530, 45 N. E. 708; 8 R. C. L.
786; 17 C. J. 1244; 23 A. L. R. 670, 690. The opinion indicates that the
decision is based upon a desire to limit the application of the doctrine of
contributory negligence in statutory actions. The court does not assume
to overrule the previous cases under the statute in which contributory neg-
ligence has been a good defense; but because of its disapproval of the
principle, refuses to apply it to facts not clearly covered by the decisions.
The court might have justified the result it reached by completely reversing
its former position and holding that in an action for a statutory penalty
contributory negligence is no defense. McKay v. Syracuse Rapid Transit
R. Co. (1913) 208 N. Y. 359, 101 N. E. 885; Wilmot v. McPadden (1905)
78 Conn. 276, 61 Atl. 1069; Watson v. Southern R. Co. (1903) 66 S. C. 47,
44 S. E. 375. Absent such a basis, the decision lacks both logic and
authority. J. A. G., '31.
JUDGMENTS-EFFnCT OF FAILURE TO SERVE ALL JOINT DEFENDANTS.-
Three defendants were sued as joint tort-feasors, but only one was served.
Plaintiff proceeded to judgment without dismissing as to the two not
served. On appeal the judgment was declared void as against all defend-
ants. Cunningham v. Franke (Mo. A. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 106. The de-
cision was put on the ground that it did not settle the rights of all parties
to the action, and that R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4223, which provides for con-
tribution among joint tort-feasors, would give defendants properly served
rights against the other defendants without service on them, unless this
result was reached.
A number of cases follow what seems to be the more conservative view
in holding that failure of service against some joint defendants causes the
judgment to be void against all. Boutwell v. Grayson (1918) 118 Miss. 80,
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79 So. 61; Lawrence v. Stone (1909) 160 Ala. 382, 49 So. 376. But the
majority of modern cases reach the opposite result. Taylor v. Hunstead
& Taylor (Tex. Com. App. 1924) 257 S. W. 232; Torrey v. Br'uner (1910)
60 Fla. 365, 53 So. 337. Missouri has uniformly held in contract cases that
the judgment is valid against the defendants properly served. Nations v.
Beard (1924) 216 Mo. A. 33, 267 S. W. 19; Boyd 'v. Ellis (1891) 107 Mo.
A. 394, 18 S. W. 29; Williams v. Hudson (1887) 93 Mo. 524, 6 S. W. 261;
Lenox v. Clark (1873) 52 Mo. 115. The question presented by the principal
case is whether there is sufficient reason to reach the opposite result in
tort cases.
The reason given by the Missouri court in reaching its decision is that
because of the statute of contribution an injustice would be worked by the
other possible result. The statute, R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4223, reads as
follows: "Defendants in a judgment founded on an action for a private
wrong shall be subject to contribution, and all other consequences of such
judgment, in the same manner and to the same extent as defendant in an
action founded on contract. . . ." It is evident that the purpose of the
statute was to give a right of contribution in tort cases equal to the right
in contract cases. But as we have seen, the Missouri court will not in a
contract case declare a judgment void against all defendants merely because
some are not served, notwithstanding the right of contribution among joint
obligors. Why this right of contribution should be given greater importance
in a tort case is difficult to see, in view of the fact that the statute creating
the right declares it to be the same as in a contract action. In either case
the right exists whether or not the joint obligors or tort-feasors are joined;
and since it was not necessary that they be joined in the first instance, fail-
ure to serve one should not invalidate the judgment against the others.
It is true of course that no judgment against 'defendants improperly
served should be recorded; but it does not necessarily follow that it should
therefore be declared entirely void. The names of those not served should
be striken from the record but the judgment alllowed to be good against
those who have had their day in court. Against them the plaintiff has com-
mitted no error. J. A. G., '31.
TRESPASS BY AIRPLANE-EXTENT OF ESTATES IN LAND.-Plaintiff owned
an estate next to defendant's air port, so located that planes frequently
passed over plaintiff's land at low altitudes in landing and taking off. Be-
ing able to prove no actual damage, plaintiff sought to enjoin what he al-
leged was a technical trespass to his land. The court recognized the tres-
pass but denied the injunction on the grounds that planes never pass twice
in the same place, that there was no danger of a prescriptive easement,
and that no damage was shown. Smith v. New England Aircraft Go.
(Mass. 1930) 170 N. E. 385.
At common law, property in land was said to extend upward to infinity.
"Cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos." Co. Litt. 4a;
17 C. J. 391; Broom, LEGAL MAXIMs (9th ed. 1924) 260; Hannabalson v.
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